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The aircraft carrier operations around the Arabic Peninsula will be one of the most prominent aspects of the initial phase of the oncoming war against Iraq, this foremost because several local states which otherwise have large US bases, will probably not permit the USA to use these, nor their airspace. The Arabic Peninsula is surrounded by the Red Sea in the West, the Arabic Sea in the south, Gulf of Oman in the south-east, and the Persian Gulf in the East. Experiences showed, that carrier operations from each of these areas are possible, but that there can be very distinct limitations – and even dangers - in some cases. In addition, the north-western end of the Arabic Peninsula – or, more properly said the area where Lebanon, Israel, Syria, and Jordan are positioned – ends with the eastern side of the Mediterranean Sea. The Mediterranean Sea is the shortest sea-communication between the USA and the Middle East, and a strategically important area, connecting Europe, Northern Africa, and the Middle East, as well as – via the Black Sea - continental Asia. The Mediterranean is the main operational area of the US 6th Fleet, with HQs at Neaples, and the most important bases in Rota, Spain; Sigonella (Sicily), Italy; and Souda Bay (Crete), Greece. The 6th Fleet operated carrier battle groups (CVBGs) in the Eastern Mediterranean almost since it was founded, in the aftermath of the WWII, but only seldom in combat. During the Suez Crisis, in 1956, the USN operated a CVBG with two carriers on station between Cyprus and Lebanon, and further to the south, in part disturbing the operations of the Franco-British naval task force, that involved no less but five aircraft- and two helicopter carriers, busy with operations against Egypt. Only two years later, in 1958, the USN aircraft- and helicopter carriers were instrumental during the US intervention in Lebanon. After a longer pause, the USN aircraft carriers were again deployed in the area on combat – or combat-like – operations in 1983, during the spoiled UN effort to establish peace in Lebanon. At the time the 6th Fleet usually held two carriers on station – the so-called “Beagle Station” - off Beirut, and in December 1983 two of these launched a near-catastrophic strike against Syrian and Druze artillery and SAM positions west and north of Beirut, in which two US aircraft were shot down and after which the US naval aviation started to change its modus-operandi for similar operations in the future. 1983 also saw French carrier Clemanceau operate in front of the Lebanese coast, and launching strikes against Druze artillery positions in Lebanon. In 1987, during the hostage crisis in Lebanon, the 6th Fleet again deployed two aircraft carriers in the area, but the aircraft from these flew only reconnaissance missions. In total, the carrier operations in the Eastern Mediterranean were characteristic for what is today called the “litorral warfare”, which means that carriers are frequently forced to operate very close under the coast and potential threats. Consequently, their naval operations remained short in range and endurance. The situation changed in the wake of the IIPGW, in 1991, when – in the frame of the operation “Save Heaven”, which saw the USA establish a security zone for Kurds in northern Iraq – the USN aircraft embarked on aircraft carriers in the Eastern Mediterranean started flying long-range patrol missions over northern Iraq. At the time, there was only one USN carrier in the area, the relatively old USS Forrestal (CV-59). With support from USAF tanker aircraft, the F-1As of the VF-11 and VF-31 used the Turkish airspace to fly around Syria and reach Iraq. This route – ever since used exclusively by ground-based US and British aircraft, stationed at NATO air base in Incirlik, in Turkey - is now obviously considered as a viable alternative to sending the carriers into the Red Sea for the oncoming onslaught against Iraq, which is slightly surprising, given that carrier-based aircraft would have to fly at least 600km – but most probably over 700km – one-way over Turkey and around Syria only in order to reach the Iraqi border. For the use of cruise missiles, of course, the situation is different, but aircraft carriers do not carry any. Therefore is the logical question arising here: why is the USN still holding the carriers USS T. Roosevelt (CVN-71) and USS Truman (CVN-75) in this area, and not sending them into the Red Sea?
The Red Sea is the second most distant from Iraq. The USN has no special command responsible for Red Sea, but the CENTCOM, which is responsible for the whole Middle East and Southern Asia. Carrier operations inside the Red Sea are a relatively young affair, initiated only during the early 1970s. For example, during the October War, in 1973, the USN’s 7th (Pacific) Fleet deployed one of its WWII-carriers into the Red Sea, in order to position it within the reach of Israel: the plane was, namely, that in the case of emergency the whole air wing – consisting of Douglas A-4 Skyhawk and Vought F-8 Crusader fighters – would be flown to Israel, so to reinforce the IDF/AF. Afterwards, the carrier operations in the area remained limited: during the first half of the 1970s Egypt was still considered as a Soviet ally, and the southern entrance into the Red Sea was “blocked” by the Soviet bases in Aden and Sokotra, in South Yemen. The situation changed in the early 1980s, when Egypt started permitting USN warships to use the Suez Canal. By 1986 the situation improved so far that even nuclear carriers – the first of these being the USS Enterprise (CVN-65, during the Libya crisis) – were permitted to use this waterway. In 1990 and 1991, of course, the Suez Canal was of vital importance for the USN to be able to swiftly move assets to Saudi Arabia, the Red Sea, and even the Persian Gulf. Nevertheless, the Red Sea is currently another area from which the operations of naval aviation would be facing considerable problems. Namely, in order to reach Iraq from the Red Sea, the USN aircraft would either have to fly over Saudi Arabia – which turned down the US request for permission to do so – or at least over Jordan, the government of which issued such permission already. Nevertheless, this means not much: namely, in order to reach the Iraqi border from the Red Sea, the USN aircraft still have to cover at least 650km. The situation could eventually be improved if the carriers would move into the Gulf of Aqaba, but this is actually out of question – for several reasons. As first, the Gulf is very restricted: only some 15km wide on average, and not very deep in several places. As first, this means that all the waters inside the Gulf belong to somebody: the Egyptians, Israelis, Jordanians, and Saudis, and that the USA would have to ask these states for permission to launch strikes against Iraq from what would – for all practical purposes – be territorial waters of these four states. As second, due to the Gulf of Aqaba being so narrow, terrorist attacks against USN warships operating there would be a relatively easy matter. Finally, in order to launch aircraft at combat weights from inside of the Gulf, the carrier would need very specific weather conditions, such as a wind from NE or from SW – but no other directions. Even more so, the carrier could move only in these directions, then would have to make a very tight turn, go downwind, and return upwind in order to be able to launch or land aircraft. Any eventual technical problems with catapults of the arrester gear could cause an outright catastrophe and end with aircraft being forced to land on Israeli, Jordanian, or Egyptian air bases, which is politically unacceptable. The Arabic Sea, the sea south of the Arabic Peninsula, and between it and the Eastern African “Horn”, and the Gulf of Oman, should be considered only a “transit areas” currently. The operations of carrier-borne aviation against Iraq from these areas would make no sense at all. During the 1980s, of course, the situation was different: with the “Tanker War” raging inside the Persian Gulf, it was viable for the USN to establish the so-called “Gonzo Station” inside the Gulf of Oman, from where the Grumman F-14 Tomcats, Grumman A-6 Intruders, and LTV A-7 Corsairs could reach deep into the Persian Gulf, or the pressure upon Iran was executed without particular problems. Today, however, the “Gonzo Station” is simply too far from the target of the oncoming operation – also because most of the USN strike aircraft are now F/A-18 Hornets, which simply lack the useful range to reach Iraq from here – except they would be refueled in the air several times. Instead, the USN carriers now operate almost exclusively inside the Persian Gulf (now designated “Arabic Gulf” in the USN parlance, actually without any historical background, but for purely political purposes). The carrier operations in these waters are also a relatively new occurrence. The first USN carrier to enter the Persian Gulf was the USS Constellation (CV-64), in 1977. At the time, the ship was taking part in a highly successful joint USN, USAF, and IIAF (Imperial Iranian Air Force) exercise. After that, there was a gap of over ten years, as the USN carriers – as far as is known – have not entered the Persian Gulf until August 1990. The reasons were multiple: as long as the IPGW was raging there was a distinct danger from missile attacks by both, the Iraqis, and the Iranians, and – even more so, especially during the late 1980s – there was imminent danger from mines. By 1990 the waters of the Persian Gulf were considered safe from mines, and when Iraq invaded Kuwait, in early August, the USS Independence (CV-62) was immediately sent straigt into the Gulf. During the IIPGW, the USN operated initially two, and then four aircraft carriers in these restricted waters, and gained some quite interesting experiences. At the time, the threat of Iraqi aircraft carrying anti-ship missiles, as well as Iraqi coastal batteries, was considered very high, and for this purpose the carriers were held far from Iraq, in the lower Persian Gulf, near Bahrain. Ever since, however, the Iraqi threat diminished so much, that since 1992 USN carriers regularly operate further to the north, sometimes only some 50km east of Kuwait. From inside the Persian Gulf, the US naval aviation can reach most of Iraq by flying a direct route without any restrictions. Of course, for aircraft like F/A-18 in-flight-refueling is needed if they are to reach any target further north than an-Nasiriyah, in southern Iraq. On the other side, in order to enter the Persian Gulf, the USN carriers have to pass the Hormuz Straits, which is well covered by all sorts of anti-ship weaponry in Iranian arsenal: certainly never a very pleasant idea for most of the USN admirals, regardless how imminent the Iranian threat is or not. Once inside the Persian Gulf, the USN warships operate in specific “boxes”, each of which is assigned to one of the ships that make the CVBG. Usually, there is an AAW&CSAR (anti-air warfare and combat search and rescue) station – or “box” - directly south of the Iraqi and Kuwait coast, on average covered by at least one cruiser of the Ticonderoga-class, and a destroyer of Arleigh Burke-class. To the west from this station, there are usually two further AAW stations, that in the center covered either by another Ticonderoga-class cruiser or an Arleigh Burke-class destroyer, and the eastern one covered by British Type-42 destroyers and US Arleigh Burke-class destroyers. To the south of these three boxes, there is the “Strike” station, usually taken by one of the SSNs and one or more of Spruance-class destroyer(s), equipped with Mk.41 VL-system, carrying Tomahawk cruise-missiles. Only then, and sometimes up to 50km further to the south, will the carrier with its close-in defense ships be positioned. While on station in the northern Persian Gulf, the USN tends to position one escort ship on each side of the carrier: one facing Iran in the east, one towards north, and another towards Saudi Arabia. An exception from this rule was the Operation Desert Fox, when the USS Enterprise CVBG was relatively small, and for this reason all the stations kept tighter together: in fact, the carrier operated so far north, that from it the launchings of Tomahawks from the “Strike” station could have been seen. Considering the current composition of USN CVBGs sent into the Persian Gulf, it can be expected that the CENTCOM will join these into a single CVBG, with two – or more – carriers operating within their own boxes, surrounded by several layers of AAW, Strike, and ASW ships. Also, the AAW, CSAR, and Strike boxes to the north of carriers will be occupied by several ships instead of only one or two. An advantage of such organization is the de-confliction of assets: the commanders will know where the ships will be, so it will be easier to organize corridors along which the aircraft will move towards and back from Iraq, tanker tracks, and AEW- and ASuW-stations. Also, the northernmost AAW station will always be able to check if there is not some Iraqi fighter tracking the returning attack aircraft in order to try something against the ships: facing an enemy like the Iraqi regime is never easy to predict, and HQ exercises held last year by CENTCOM showed that the USN commanders still think in too conventional forms. In the air, all these theatres of operations (TO) will also need their own organization. If the USS Truman and USS T. Roosevelt indeed remain in the Eastern Mediterranean, the USAF will need to reserve a considerable number of KC-10A tankers to support them alone. The Tomcats and Hornets from the two carriers will take off, move into the Turkish airspace, hit the tanker and then fly together with it straight to the Iraqi border. The tankers will then wait there until the USN aircraft come back. Most of such missions will last at least three to four hours, which means the same tankers will not be available for any other tasks on the same day. The same picture will be seen if any strikes will be mounted from the Red Sea, with the difference that in such case the tankers will have to fly a longer trip out of Turkey, Crete, or even Egypt. . In both cases, while underway to their targets, the USN fighters will also have to take care about their course, in order not to enter the airspace of the countries along which borders they will fly. Slightly different will be the situation inside the Persian Gulf. Here there will be a “no-go” zone along the Iranian borders, and probably a similar zone along the Saudi borders. In between there will be specific corridors along which the aircraft will have to move while flying towards, and other corridors used for returning back from Iraq. During the initial attack, manned aircraft will only start once after the first salvo of Tomahawk cruise missiles will be launched: this order will follow later as well, as first in order to give the cruise missiles ample time to hit the Iraqi air defense in advance of manned aircraft (and thus cause the Iraqis also to fire their combat sets of SAMs, so their SAM-sites cannot fire at manned aircraft). An additional positive point from the standpoint of naval aviators will be that the carriers – currently these are USS Kitty Hawk (CV-63), USS Constellation (CV-64), and USS Nimitz (CVN-68), as well as the HMS Ark Royal – will always operate around the same area, so the crews will get used to search for them in specific places. Nevertheless, in their operations over Iraq, the USN and RN fighters will heavily depend on USAF E-3 Sentry AWACS aircraft and J-STARS, even if it must be expected the USN to also dispatch single E-2C Hawkeye AEW-aircraft with each of its strike circle. Due to immense efforts on improvements of mutual communications, these assets will now be able to work much closely together, as their crews will easily communicate via the JTIDS data-link system. Once over Iraq, the USN and RN crews (as well as RAF Harrier pilots embarked aboard the HMS Ark Royal) will enter an area most of them already know: in the last 12 years the US and British military were able to give a whole new generation of their pilots the taste of combat and combat-like operations over Iraq during the control operations over the so-called “No-Fly Zones”. Once inside the Iraqi airspace the Tomcats, Hornets, Sea Harriers, and Harriers will enter a highly organized and controlled arena, where each aircraft has distinct role and task. They will enter the target zones, confirm this with the AWACS covering their area, meet the SEAD/DEAD assets assigned for their cover, and then move to deliver their munition on the target – usually from comfortable distance and safety in the face of the Iraqi air defenses. Initially, most of the targets will be pre-designated before the take-off, but the longer the operation will last, the less predictable will the targets be: the deeper the US ground troops advance into Iraq, the more likely will USN and RN pilots not know which target will they attack on the next mission. Instead of pre-destined targets, namely, the pilots will strike targets of opportunity, assigned to them by the troops on the ground. This is a new form of CAS, where precision-guided munitions can be brought to full bear thanks to improved communication systems between the forward-air-controllers (FAC) on the ground, and the tactical aircraft in the air, as well as excellent designation equipment available to the FAC today: modern US-FAC can even designate targets for GPS-guided munitions without particular problems (although, sometimes mistakes happen, and the FAC enter their own positions instead of that of the enemy, which then ends with bombs falling on them). Additionally, each of the F-14-squadrons deployed in the Gulf now have crews trained as “fast forward air controllers” (FFAC): in this role, the Tomcats loiter over the target area, monitor the developments on the ground with the help of their LANTRIN-containers, and designate targets for other aircraft. The experiences from Afghanistan have shown the increasing importance of the USAF RQ-1 Predator-drones for the capability of air power to support the fast-running battle on the ground. Predators can also loiter over the target area for hours, and supply precious real-time targeting informations to crews of tactical fighters. The F-14s will also still play an important role as the only tactical reconnaissance asset operational with the USN: many of their TARPS-containers – two or three remain operational with every F-14-unit - are now digitalized, and some can transfer their photographs to the responsible HQs even in real-time. In total, considerably modernized since 1991, and due to the problems with basing in nearby countries, the naval aviation will play a more important role this time, and – due to the sheer intensity of the war that is to be expected this time – the carriers are highly likely to illustrate their capability of high cyclic rate of operations. Equipped with GPS-guided and laser-homing bombs, the naval fighters will have an important role in the support of the troops on the ground, while carriers will ensure the US “secure” bases without the need to ask for basing rights wherever possible. USS Kitty Hawk (CV-63), CVW-5 (NF) - VF-154 Black Knights: F-14A - VFA-27 Royal Maces: F/A-18C - VFA-192 Golden Dragons: F/A-18C - VFA-195 Dambusters: F/A-18C - VAQ-136 Gaunlets: EA-6B - VAW-115 Liberty Bells: E-2C - VS-21 Fighting Redtails: S-3B - HS-14 Chargers: SH/HH-60F/H Ships of the CVBG: USS Bremerton (SSN-698) USS Chancellorsville (CG-62) USS Cowpens (CG-63) USS John S. McCain (DDG-56) USS O’Brien (DD-975) USS Cushing (DD-985) USS Vandergrift (FFG-48) USS Gary (FFG-51)
USS Constellation (CV-64), CVW-2 (NE) - VF-2 Bounty Hunters: F-14D - VFA-137 Kestrels: F/A-18C - VFA-151 Vigilantes: F/A-18C - VMFA-323 Death Rattlers: F/A-18C - VAQ-131 Lancers: EA-6B - VAW-116 Sun Kings: E-2C - VS-38 Red Griffins: S-3B - HS-2 Golden Falcons: SH/HH-60F/H Ships of the CVBG: USS Columbia (SSN-771) USS Valley Forge (CG-50) USS Bunker Hill (CG-52) USS Milius (DDG-69) USS Higgins (DDG-76) USS Fletcher (DD-992) USS Thach (FFG-43) USS Rainier (AOE-7) USS Nimitz (CVN-68), CVW-11 (NH) – currently underway to the Gulf - VFA-14 Tophatters: F/A-18F - VFA-41 Black Aces: F/A-18F - VFA-94 Mighty Shrikes: F/A-18C - VFA-97 Warhawks: F/A-18C - VAQ-135 Black Ravens: EA-6B - VAW-117 Wallbangers: E-2C - VS-29 Dragonfires: S-3B - HS-6 Indians: SH/HH-60F/H Ships of the CVBG: USS Pasadena (SSN-752) USS Normandy (CG-60) USS Chosin (CG-65) USS Fitzgerald (DDG-62) USS Benfold (DDG-65) USS Oldendorf (DD-972) USS Rodney M. Davis (FFG-60) USS Bridge (AOE-10) USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71), CVW-8 (AJ) - VF-213 Black Lions: F-14D - VFA-15 Valions: F/A-18C - VFA-87 Golden Warriors (Warparty): F/A-18C - VFA-201 Hunters: F/A-18A - VAQ-141 Shadowhawks: EA-6B - VAW-124 Bear Aces: E-2C - VS-24 Scouts: S-3B - HS-3 Tridents: SH/HH-60F/H Note: it is possible the wing includes also the F/A-18Cs of the VMFA-312 Checkerboards. Ships of the CVBG: USS Anzio (CG-68) USS Cape St. George (CG-71) USS Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) USS Porter (DDG-78) USS Winston S. Churchill (DDG-81) USS Carr (FFG-52) USS Artic (AOE-8)
USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72), CVW-14 (NK) - VF-31 Tomcatters: F-14D - VFA-25 First of the Fleet: F/A-18C - VFA-113 Stingers: F/A-18C - VFA-115 Rampagers: F/A-18E/F - VAQ-139 Cougars: EA-6B - VAW-113 Black Eagles: E-2C - VS-35 Blue Wolves: S-3B - HS-4 Black Knight: SH/HH-60F/H Ships of the CVBG: USS Honolulu (SSN-718) USS Mobile Bay (CG-53) USS Shiloh (CG-67) USS Paul Hamilton (DDG-60) USS Crommelin (FFG-37) USS Reuben James (FFG-57) USS Camden (AOE-2) USS Harry S. Truman (CVN-75), CVW-3 (AB) - VF-32 Swordsmen: F-14B - VFA-37 Bulls: F/A-18C - VFA-105 Gunslingers: F/A-18C - VMFA-115 Silver Eagles: F/A-18A - VAQ-130 Zappers: EA-6B - VAW-126 Sea Hawks: E-2C - VS-22 Vidars: S-3B - HS-7 Rusty Dogs: SH/HH-60F/H Ships of the CVBG: USS San Jacinto (CG-56) USS Mitscher (DDG-57) USS Donald Cook (DDG-75) USS Oscar Austin (DDG-79) USS Briscoe (DD-977) USS Deyo (DD-989) USS Hawes (FFG-53) USS Kanawha (T-AO-187) USS Mount Baker (T-AE-26)
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